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Transnational Consumer Law-Reality or
Fiction?
Norbert Reich*
I.

BEYOND SPACE AND TIME: CYBER LAW

The traditional legal mechanisms of consumer protection are usually
limited to national law and, to some extent, to the law of supranational
organisations like the European Union ("EU"). There may be trends to
extend the sphere of application or to make sure that EU nationals can
always refer to the protection of their home country, but this will be
difficult to implement in a globalised market with transactions easily
crossing borders, especially by the use of the internet. This is
particularly obvious in cases of software transactions: there is not a
national marketplace, only a virtual marketplace, not determined by
space and time. The partners may not know each other's residence, only
their IP address; the payment and the download-delivery is done via the
internet, without any personal contact of the parties being a necessary or
usual prerequisite of the transaction. It seems impossible or at least very
complicated under existing conflict rules to determine jurisdiction and
applicable law.'
International uniform laws like the Convention for the Sale of
Goods ("CSIG") ratified by most States (with the exception of the United
Kingdom, Portugal and Ireland) exclude consumer transactions "unless
the seller.., neither knew or ought to have known that the goods were
bought for (personal, family or household) use" (Article 2a) and are not
* This article is part of a greater study on "Crisis and Future of European
Consumer Law," published in the British Yearbook of Consumer Law, 2008/2009, at 365. See also my earlier paper in the 2008 edition of the Uniform Commercial Code Law
Journal,at pages 67 to 77.
1. There is abundant literature of this phenomenon. See HANS MICKLITZ, NORBERT
REICH & PETER RoTT, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW ch. 7 (2008). In
UnderstandingEuropean Consumer Law, the authors discuss the practical application of
the consumer protection provisions of Article 5 the Rome Convention, Article 6 of the
new Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the EP and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law
applicable to contractual obligations ("Rome F'), 2008 O.J. (L 176), 6, and of specific EC
directives to cross-border transactions.
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mandatory in their legal application according to Article 6.2 They are
therefore not appropriate for cross-border consumer transactions. Other
soft-law initiatives like the UNIDROIT-principles 3 are limited to
commercial transactions and while the Principles of European Contract
Law contain some rather weak consumer protection provisions 4 they are
applicable (if at all) only to transactions within the EU. Both are without
prejudice to mandatory consumer protection law. The globalisation of
trade in consumer markets, in particular via the internet, has not
generated a globalisation of law. "Cyber law" is still an empty
catchword without a supportive legal framework that would force
transactions via e-commerce into the national legal system. In any event,
the national legal system is not adequate any more for these transactions.
The World Trade Organisation ("WTO") has not yet emerged as an
actor in transnational private law or, in particular, consumer law, with the
exception of intellectual property via the TRIPS agreement. 5 This is due
to the WTO's mostly "negative" impact on national (and supranational)
law: it is concerned with impediments to international trade mostly by
product-related regulations which cannot be justified by mandatory and
proportionate public interests like health or safety.6 Therefore, the WTO
does not have jurisdiction for setting mandatory standards for
international commercial and consumer transactions, including conflict
resolution.
II.

CONSUMER LAW AS IMPEDIMENT TO E-COMMERCE?

Some authors go even further in their critique. Consumer law (in
the narrow sense as used by the EU or in a broader sense as advocated
here) is always based on mandatory standards, such as information,
2. JAN RAMBERG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 25 (3d ed. 2004);
U. Magnus, in A. STAUDINGER, CISG IN BGB-KOMMENTAR art. 2, paras. 10-31 (13 ed.
2005).
3. Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principlesand TransnationalLaw, in
THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 23 (K.P. Berger ed., 2001); Michael Joachim
Bonell & R. Peleggi, UNIDROIT Principles of InternationalCommercial Contracts and
Principles of European Contract Law: A Synoptical Table, 2004 UNIFORM L. REV. 31596 (comparing the Unidroit principles with the Principles of European Contract Law
(Lando-Principles)).
4. Hans-W. Micklitz, The Principlesof European ContractLaw and the Protection
of the Weaker Party, 27 J.CONSUMER POL'Y 339-56 (2004).
5. Railf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanisation,
Globalisation,and Privatisation,54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 867 (2006).
6. For
details,
see
HANS-W.
MICKLITZ,
INTERNATIONALES
PRODUKTSICHERHEITSRECHT 257 (1995) (arguing it should be transformed into a "human
right of safety." See also WTO - TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND SPS MEASURES 96-120 (R.
Wolfrum et al. eds., 2007) (providing a detailed commentary on the clause concerning
actions "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" of Art. XX (b) GATT
and related agreements).
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quality, fairness in pre-formulated contract terms, adequate remedies,
non-discrimination rules, and access to justice. This entire complex of
protection is vested upon a functioning state legal order which makes the
judge the final arbiter in consumer disputes. Law is state-oriented and
guaranteed. In the EU, this follows the fundamental right to judicial
protection under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights
("ECHR"), confirmed on many occasions by the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") 7 and to be included in Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty on
European Union integrating the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU
and in particular Article 47 on judicial protection into EU law. In its
numerous cases concerning the obligations of Member States to
implement and enforce Community consumer law, the Court has insisted
on this obligation de r~sultat of states also under Article 10 EC; a
violation may even make the state directly liable towards consumers
8
under the Francovich-doctrine.
This concept of consumer protection is challenged as a consequence
of a globalised trade and consumer market. This challenge comes in a
seemingly contradictory direction:
"

Consumer law is criticised because it becomes an
impediment to trade by imposing mandatory standards on
business which differ from country to country or region to
region. As a result, search cost for finding out applicable
law to consumer transactions become unreasonably high.

*

As a seemingly contradictory consequence, consumer law
cannot be fully be implemented in a globalised world.
State borders are still legal borders, especially in the
enforcement of consumer rights.

Consumer law in the traditional, state based concept runs the risk of
becoming an ideology: instead of protection, it compartmentalises the
(global) market, and at the same time it promises a protective standard
which it cannot possibly achieve. For some authors there seems to be
only one way out of this dilemma: If mandatory consumer protection
standards prove to be dysfunctional to trade, the easiest way therefore to
overcome this dilemma would be a system of liberalised world trade
based on self-regulation while guaranteeing freedom of contract for
business and freedom of choice for consumers.

7. Takis Tridimas, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW 418 (2d ed
2006); NORBERT REICH, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW 239 (2d ed. 2005).
8. Case C-178/94, Dillenkofer et.al. v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4845.
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III. LEXMERCATORIA ELECTRONICA AS EMERGING "TRANSNATIONAL
LAW"?

International commercial law had to face the challenges of
globalisation already for many years because trade is by its very nature
directed across borders, and the emerging lex mercatoria seemingly has
been an answer to these challenges. The concept of lex mercatoria is
quite controversial and cannot be discussed here in detail. 9 It relates to a
set of norms, practices, and standards in international trade and conflict
resolution mechanisms mostly through arbitration which have evolved
through commercial usage and customs, and have to some extent been
"codified" by private international organisations like the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), International
Standardising
Organisations like ISO, international law harmonising institutions like
UNIDROIT, and specialised organisations for special business areas or
for specific ways of communication-e.g., ICANN in the particular case
of the internet.10 The basis of applicability in commercial contracts is not
state law or an international treaty, but usually agreement of the parties
which need not be express and formalised, but can be implied. This
practice may result in general principles which are accepted by the
relevant business community as guidelines for their commercial
transactions. They will usually be enforced in arbitration; arbitrators will
use them in contract interpretation and decision making unless the
arbitration agreement provides otherwise. Therefore, some authors argue
for a "private ordering," meaning a law created by the economic agents
themselves which results in a "global governance" of self-regulation."1
Other authors refer to a "global civil society" which emerges as a "law
creating instance" via a "creeping codification of transnational law."12
These concepts seem however to be somewhat exaggerated and
misleading because in the end the basis of their applicability to
international commercial transactions is the free will of the parties. The
parties can always opt-out of these "standards" or "principles" even
9.

See KLAUS P. BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA

(1999); THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Klaus P. Berger ed. 2002); CHRISTIAN
JOERGES, INGER-JOHANNE SAND & GUNTHER TEUBNER,

TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); Michaels & Jansen, supra note 5, at 870 (also referring
to the "private law created within the internet community").
10. See G. Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State Centred
Constitutional Theory?, in JOERGES, SAND AND TEUBNER, supra note 9, at 18; Jochen von

Bernstorff, The Structural Limitations of Network Governance: ICANN as a Case in
Point, in JOERGES, SAND AND TEUBNER, supra note 9, at 257. This is not the place to
discuss these concepts.
11.

See PETER-GRALF CALLIESS, GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRAGE

196 (2006).
12.

See THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 12-19.
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though there may be no incentives to do so, or transaction cost
economics will force the parties to subscribe to these standards. It may
also be imputed that, if the parties did not come to an agreement on
applicable law or if there are doubts on interpretation, the lex mercatoria
like the UNIDROIT principles will be applicable as "general principles,"3
commercial practice or custom, particularly in commercial arbitration.1
But arbitration is subject to second level control in enforcement
proceedings by Member State or EU "ordrepublic,"
as the ECJ has said
15
14
in its seminal ECO-Swiss and Clarojudgments.
Can these concepts of lex mercatoria, of "private ordering of
markets," of "global governance via self-regulation" be transferred to
consumer law? This is indeed the thesis of the German author G.-P.
Calliess in his seminal work on TransnationalConsumer Contracts. He
proposes these concepts as an alternative to the erosion of national (and
EU) consumer law in a globalised context. He discusses a number of
initiatives and mechanisms which seem to confirm his theory:
By establishing a global civil constitution for a transnational
consumer contract law, reflexive institutions must be created which
organise the phenomena of self-regulation and of private ordering in
such a way, that on one hand they promote effective legal protection
via alternative consumer protection mechanisms, and on the other
guarantee fairness and justice of such procedures via-A-vis the
consumer. 16
This radical separation of (transnational) consumer law from the state (or
the EU)-and as a consequence from the existing state controlled
mechanisms of consumer protection-provokes critique. Such a concept
has a number of weaknesses. No representative consumer association
exists world wide which could promote or at least monitor and support
these standards in some sort of collective consumer interest. It cannot be
implied that this would be taken care of by business institutions
themselves. Neither state power nor collective action by social partners

13. For the UNIDROIT principles, see Bonell, supra note 3, at 28-36.
14. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton Int'l, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055
(concerning the competition ordrepublic).
15. Case C-168/05, Elisa Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium, 2006
E.C.R. 1-10421. See Norbert Reich, More clarity after Claro?, 2007 EUR. REV.
CONTRACT L. 41.
But see a critique by P. Landolt, Limits on Court Review of
InternationalArbitrationAwards Assessed in Light of States' Interests and In Particular
in Light of EU Law Requirements, 2007 AR-BITRATION INT'L 63-91, 77-82. For a recent
discussion, see N. Reich, Negotiations and Adjudication: Class actions and arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts, in THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN THE EU 345-60
(Cafaggi & Micklitz eds., 2009).
16. See CALLIESS, supra note 11, at 340 (translation by author).
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There is no

consumer consensus to accept unilaterally-imposed standards by the
international "business" or "e-commerce" community. A "global civil
society" may exist on the business side using the internet (even though
this seems quite doubtful due to conflicting interests as von Bemstorff
has shown with regard to ICANN 18); it certainly is not true with regard to
highly fragmented consumer markets.
In his search for an alternative to the traditional state oriented
consumer law, Calliess is satisfied if the soft-law mechanisms of
'transnational consumer law' at least attain what he calls "rough
justice"'9-probably meaning lower standards of protection than already
guaranteed within existing consumer law. This must be achieved
through different ADR-mechanisms, including possibly consumer
arbitration. What are the standards by which these mechanisms are
supposed to function? What about third-party effects of these "private
orderings" vis-A-vis consumers as individuals or as a group which must
be legitimised either by democratic processes or by agreement of those
concerned? Is there an international consensus on certain minimal
standards for consumer protection? How far is the principle of freedom
of contract-which indeed is a basic rule of international commercial
transactions-extended to consumer transactions which are, as we have
seen, excluded both from the "hard law" of the CISG and the "soft law"
of the UNIDROIT-principles?
"Rough justice" as advocated by Calliess means indeed rough
justice-only a vague guarantee of certain consumer expectations which
can hardly be called "rights" and which usually can be "enforced" only
via private arbitration not subject to any public control or transparency,
and without clear rules on applicable law. The concept of "transnational
law" remains unclear and illusionary; it hits the death stroke to the
consumer acquis either on an EU or a national basis. It is already
doubtful whether it can really be called law at all. This either requires
some state monitoring, or a minimum consensus between the partiestwo elements well set out in Article 1134 of the French Code Civil
whereby "les conventions ljgalementform es tiennent lieu de loi 6 ceux
qui les ont faites" ("contracts legally entered into take force of law for
those who have made them").
Calliess defends his concept with the following words:

17.

See D. Schiek, Private rulemaking and European governance-issues of

legitimacy, 2007 EUR. L. REv. 443 (concerning the need for (collective) autonomy to
justify private rulemaking in the EU context). This also applies to international law.
18. See von Bernstorff, supra note 10, at 274-81.
19.

CALLIESS,

supra note 11, at 351.
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Transnational law describes a third category of autonomous legal

systems beyond the traditional categories of national or international
law. Transnational law is created and developed by the global civil
society through acts creating law (Rechtsschbpfungskriifte). (1) It is
based (a) on general principles of law and (b) on practice and custom
in the civil society, which leads to their confirmation and further
development. (2) Its application, interpretation and development is
regularly conferred to private providers of dispute resolution

mechanisms. (3) Its mandatory character is based on legally
(rechtsf6rmig) organised orders and enactment of social-economic
sanctions. (4) A codification of transnational law-if at all--occurs
in the form of general catalogues of principles and rules, standardised
contract forms and codes of conduct which are established
by private
20
standard setting institutions (Normierungsinstitutionen).

This definition may be true for the classical lex mercatoria but always
requires some express or implied agreement between the parties to be
applicable in their relations if there has been no constitutionally
delegated power behind its enactment. It cannot be used against third
parties like consumers who have not participated in the elaboration of
this "transnational law," neither personally nor via their representatives.
We do not argue that law always requires state enactment-but if this is
not the case there must at least be some other mechanisms substituting
the decision of the legislator which can only be party autonomy of those
concerned, whether individual or collective. Even the argument of
Calliess set out above requires some sort of "conferral" of power to
(binding?) dispute resolution mechanisms, but does not explain who has
validly effected this transferral to the detriment of state or other
legitimate mechanisms; the idea of an "international civil society" is too
vague and too abstract to have this power of conferral. Therefore, the
concept of "transnational law" cannot be transferred to consumer
transactions even in a globalised setting without the state because of the
lack of equality of parties and the limited freedom of choice for
consumers.
It is interesting to see that the so-called institutions of an
international "civil society" upon which Calliess relies for his concept of
"transnational law" refer themselves to mandatory standards which are
set by state (or international 21 respective to supranational) law. It seems
20. Id. at 371 (italics added) (translated by author).
21. The need for mandatory international standards has been emphasised by the
International Council on Human Rights Policy. See INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
POL'Y, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL

OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES (2002),

available at

http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/7/

107_report en.pdf; see also Michele Micheletti & Andreas Follesdal, Shopping for
Human Rights, 30 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 167, 167 (2007).
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that the international "civil society" (which is, in my opinion, a fiction
anyway) cannot live without the state as will be shown in the following
section.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF SOFT-LAW STANDARDS-AN ALTERNATIVE TO
"HARD" LAW?
It can be useful to look at some of the soft-law standards which
have been developed by internet service providers. Most of these are
American, being the main players on the global market for e-commerce.
The surprising point in all these systems seems to be that they offer the
consumer certain mechanisms to guarantee satisfaction and to resolve
disputes, but they do not completely replace the traditional, state bound
consumer law and protection. The following examples are documented
by Calliess:

22.

*

The Better Business BureauOnLine "Code of Online
Business Practice" 22 contains 5 principles, including
consumer satisfaction. It recommends informal dispute
settlement mechanisms, including non-binding or
conditionally binding arbitration (under which the decision
is binding on the company if the consumer elects to accept
the decision, thereby making it binding on the consumer as
well), without pre-empting further governmental actions in
this field; the critical point for arbitration is obviously the
'election by the consumer'---can it be done in general
contract terms communicated electronically to the
consumer?-Calliess does not answer this question.

*

Agreement between Consumers International and the
Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce ADR
Alternative Dispute resolution Guidelines.2 3
mechanisms are greatly encouraged, dispute resolution
may be based on equity or codes of conduct. Binding
arbitration before the dispute is to be avoided "where such
commitment would have the effect of depriving the
consumer of the right to bring an action before the courts."
The
Development of ADR is left to governments.

See Better Business Bureau, BBBOnline, Code of Online Business Practices,

www.bbbonline.org/reliability/code/CodeEnglish.pdf, see also CALLIESS, supra note 11,

at 422 (quoting full text).
23.

GLOBAL

BUSINESS

DIALOGUE

ON

E-COMMERCE,

ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION GUIDELINES (2003), available at http://www.gbd-e.orepubs/ADR_
Guideline.pdf, see also CALLIESS, supra note 11, at 439.
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guidelines contain a plea for deregulation of formal
requirements for ADR and for a clarification of rules on
jurisdiction and applicable law to be dealt with in "a
manner that encourages both business investment and
consumer trust in electronic commerce."
"

American Bar Association (Task force) Recommendation
on Best Practices for Online Dispute Resolution Service
("ODR") Providers: 24 It clearly states that ODR Providers
"should disclose the jurisdiction where complaints against
the ODR provider can be brought, and any relevant
jurisdictional limitations."

"

ICC's "Resolving disputes online-Best practices for
ODR in B2C and C2C transactions": 25 They insist that
"companies should not obligate consumers to agree to use
binding dispute resolution processes prior to the
materialisation of a dispute. However, where permissible
under local law, pre-dispute commitments to binding
dispute resolution are acceptable if they are clearly
disclosed before the initial transaction is completed. This
will allow consumers to take the dispute resolution
provision into consideration and make an informed choice
about doing business with the company." Again, the main
point is "clear disclosure" which must be determined by
the applicable law to the contract. US-American and
Canadian law is much more generous in allowing
electronically agreed arbitration clauses through so-called
"click-wrap" agreements than the law of the Member
26
States or EU law itself.

The examples show that a concept of "transnational consumer law"
based on self- or co-regulation by "civil society" cannot work in practice.
Therefore, the main argument against such "lex mercatoriaelectronica"
24.

AMERICAN BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON ECOMMERCE AND

ADR,

RECOMMENDED

available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/BestPracticesFinal 102802.pdf;
see
also
CALLIESS, supra note 11, at 448.
25. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RESOLVING ONLINE DISPUTES (2003), available
at www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rules/statements/2004/DISPUTES-rev.pdf; see also
CALLIESS, supra note 11, at 458.
26. Comb v. PayPal Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also
Canadian Supreme Court, Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34 (Can.). For an overall critique, see Reich, supra note 15, at 46.
BEST

PRACTICES

FOR

ONLINE

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION

PROVIDERS,
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is still the binding force of state consumer law and consumer protection
mechanisms which are part of the constitutional heritage of Member
States and the Union under Article 6(2) EU, 6 ECHR. Traders may of
course enhance consumer satisfaction and make dispute resolution easier
by encouraging ADR mechanisms, a policy explicitly supported by EC
initiatives. 7
Consumers should be given easy access to ADR
mechanisms provided they are fair and transparent as proposed in EU
recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/EC.28 But the final arbiter in
a consumer dispute-even under transnational conditions-which cannot
be resolved by ADR should always be a court of law. This may create
obstacles and difficulties to e-commerce in a globalised virtual market
place; it may also be difficult and eventually impossible to enforce. But
this is not an argument against national or EU consumer law, it is the
price to be paid for globalisation allowing greater access for traders to
world markets which does not automatically overcome legal barriers.

27.
28.

See MlCKLITZ, REICH & ROTr, supra note 1, at 359-64.
1998 O.J. (L 115); 2001 O.J. (L 109).

